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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
VINCENT L. BELGARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15743 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal fro~ a conviction of Automobile Homicide, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 
(1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION rn THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, was charged by Informa-
tion with the offense of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as 
amended) (T.6, Vol.II). On November 17, 1977, the appellant 
was convicted by a jury of the offense charged in the Informa-
tion. On March 17, 1978, the appellant was sentenced by the 
above entitled Court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge presiding, 
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to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, seeks reversal of the 
judgment of guilt entered against him and a reversal of the 
instant case to the trial court with instructions to dimiss 
the complaint. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts adduced at trial are as follows. At approxi-
mately 1:00 p.m. on the 28th day of July, 1977, appellant was 
involved in an automobile-bicycle accident at the intersection 
of 7th East and 33rd South, in Salt Lake County. Appellant did 
not stop at the accident scene, but continued south on 7th East 
pursued by three private citizens: Mr. Alan Harenberg (T.89, 
Vol. II), Mr. Jerry R. Hiller (T. 6, Vol. III), and Mr. Uffe 
Traeden (T. 25, Vol.III). These individuals pursued appellant 
to a cul-de-sac on 3835 South 600 East, where appellant's 
vehicle came to a rest (T. 96, Vol.II), whereupon Mr. Harenburg 
placed appellant under a citizen's arrest (T. 98, Vol.II). 
Trooper Lynn Thompson of the Utah Highway Patrol took 
appellant into custody (T.49, Vol.III). Although there was 
evidence that appellant had been drinking, he was not given a 
field sobriety test (T.65, Vol.III). Instead, Trooper Thompson 
took appellant to St. Mark's Hospital, explaining the Utah 
- 2 -
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Implied Consent Law to him and stating that if appellant refused 
a blood alcohol test, he would lose his driver's license (T.50, 
Vol.I). Appellant, an American Indian, indicated that he did 
not want to take such a test, as it was against "God's Law" 
(T.50, Vol.I). Trooper Thompson reiterated that the test would 
be taken, by force if necessary (T.54, Vol.I). Appellant 
renewed his objection; however, at the hospital, he permitted 
himself to be placed on a gurney. At 2:35 p.m. on the same 
day, Kay Fowler, a registered nurse employed by the City-County 
Health Department, withdrew blood from appellant for the blood 
alcohol test (T.69-70, Vol.III). That blood sample was tested 
by two individuals. Lynn Davis, a chemist for the City-County 
Health Department, tested the blood sample at 10:20 a.m. on 
August 1, 1977, and found that it contained 0.28% alcohol by 
weight (T.90, Vol.III). Dr. Darrell Murdock analyzed the same 
blood sample and came to the conclusion that it contained 0.20% 
alcohol by weight (T.148, Vol.III). 
The victim of the accident, a sixteen year old male named 
Michael Winn, was transported to St. Mark's Hospital. He died 
at 8:30 p.m., the evening of the accident, due to massive 
cerebral edema, swelling of the brain (T.54, Vol.II). 
On August 1, 1977, appellant was brought before Justice 
of the Peace Charles A. Jones, where he was arrainged on charges 
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, improper 
and fraudulent registration, no driver's license, and no inspec-
- 3 -
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tion (M.6-8). No formal complaint accompanied the appellant 
(M.8); instead, he was arraigned from a booking and property 
record (M.21). Judge Jones contacted the County Attorney's 
Office, and after being assured that two formal complaints woul1 
be forthcoming, he proceeded with the arraingment (M.8-9, 30). 
That complaint was never received (M.9). 
Judge Jones advised appellant of his rights, particularly 
the right to counsel (M.10), and his right to trial by jury 
(M.10-11). Appellant waived those rights, pleaded guilty to 
the charges, and was sentenced by Judge Jones (M.11-13). Judge 
Jones sent a connnitment order to the Salt Lake County Jail pur-
suant to the results of the hearing (M.13). 
On August 3, 1977, Joseph Tesch and Spencer Austin of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, went to Judge Jones 
and petitioned for an order vacating and setting aside the 
results of the arraingment. Judge Jones signed the order, 
which was then presented to the County Jail (M.15,65). That 
same day, the County Attorney's Office filed a complaint of 
Automobile Homicide against appellant. Trial connnenced on 
November 15, 1977. 
In the preliminary hearing, and at trial, appellant's 
counsel offered a motion to dismiss the charge of automobile 
homicide, based on the single episode provision of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-402(2) (1953 as amended) (M.3, T.4, Vol.I). The 
trial court ruled that the Justice of the Peace had no juris-
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diction over the proceeding before his involving the appellant; 
hence it was a nullity and the single episode provision in-
applicable (T.73, Vol.I). Appellant's counsel next offered a 
motion to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground 
that the taking violated appellant's constitutional rights 
(T.4, Vol.I). The trial court denied that motion on the grounds 
that exigent circumstances required the taking of the blood 
test (T.3, Vol.II). Finally, appellant's counsel objected to 
testimony offered by Officer Clark Bowles, extrapolating the 
blood alcohol level back from the time of the test to the time 
of the accident, on grounds that such testimony was inadmissible 
because the State could not show when appellant had consumed 
his last drink (T.144, Vol.III). Counsel's objection was 
overruled. 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime of Auto-
mobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the 
Information, and judgment was entered thereon. Appellant 
now takes this appeal from the trial court. 
- 5 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS 
OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL ANALYSIS BECAUSE TAKING THE 
BLOOD SAMPLE AGAINST HIS WILL VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
In the 1966 case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1966), 
the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that 
the federal "exclusionary rule", under which evidence obtained 
from an unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible in a crimina: 
trial, applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Since that time, the well recognized rule has been that if 
it is found that evidence was obtained in violation of a person 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Cons ti tu· 
tion, it may not be used against the person in a criminal 
proceeding. In~. the defendant was convicted of having 
pornographic material in her possession. Such material was 
the basis of her conviction, although it was discovered by an 
unlawful search of defendant's home. The Court reasoned that 
the assurance against unreasonable searches and seizures 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless if 
evidence obtained illegally could be freely used in court. 
The Court held: 
- 6 -
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Since the Fourth Amendment's right of 
privacy has been declared enforceable 
against the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforeceable 
against them by the same sanction of ex-
clusion as is used against the Federal 
Government. 367 U.S. 643, 655. 
POINT A 
THE BLOOD SAMPLE WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF 
APPELLANT'S RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES. 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the 
United States Supreme Court was faced with a case factually 
similar to the case at bar. There, the defendant was convicted 
of driving an automobile while under the influence .of intoxi-
eating liquor. The defendant was arrested at a hospital where 
he received treatment for injuries suffered in an accident 
involving the automobile he had been driving. The officer who 
made the arrest smelled liquor on defendant's breath at the 
scene of the accident and at the hospital. On the basis of 
his observations, the officer ordered a physician to take a 
blood sample from defendant. Defendant refused to consent to 
the blood test, on the advice of counsel, but the sample was 
drawn against his consent. At trial, the defendant objected 
to the admission of the blood analysis in evidence, contending 
it violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
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Although the Schmerber Court affirmed the defendant's 
conviction, it recognized his privacy interest in his own 
blood. The Court stated that a compulsory administration of 
a blood test: 
.. plainly involves the broadly conceived 
reach of a search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. That Amendment expressly 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated. " 
.It could not reasonably be argued . 
that the administration of the blood test 
in this case was free of the constraints 
of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing 
procedures plainly constitute searches of 
"persons", and depend antecedently.upon 
seizures of "persons", within the meaning 
of that Amendment. [Emphasis in original] 
384 U.S. 757, 767. 
Having thus found that the Fourth Amendment applies to compul-
sory extraction of blood, the Court went on to find that under 
the facts presented by Schmerber, the search was not "unreason-
able", based upon the fact that the officer had probable cause 
to believe the defendant was intoxicated and that evidence of 
intoxication would soon be destroyed by the body's process of 
eliminating alcohol. However, the Court recognized that its 
holding may have been different in another situation: 
Petitioner is not one of the few who on 
grounds of fear, concern for health, or 
religious scriple might prefer some other 
means of testing, such as the "breathalyzer" 
test petitioner refused. . We need not 
decide whether such wishes would have to be 
respected. 384 U.S. 757, 771. 
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The Court further limited Schmerber to its facts in its con-
eluding statement: 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this 
judgment only on the facts of the present record. 
The integrity of an individuals person is a 
cherished value of society. That we today hold 
that the Constitution does not forbid the states 
minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates 
that it permits more substantial intrusions, or 
intrusions under other conditions. 
384 U.S. 757, 772. 
Appellant contends that since the blood sample in this 
case was obtained against his wishes and ~~ violation of his re-
ligious scruples, this case falls within the exception implicity 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber, 
supra, to the rule established in that case. Appellant was 
placed under arrest soon after the incident by Officer Lynn 
Thompson of the Utah Highway Patrol (T.40, Vol.I). Although 
appellant had suffered extensive injuries, he emphatically 
refused any medical attention officer by the officer (T.40, 
Voll). Appellant was then transported by the officer to St. 
Mark's Hospital to obtain treatment and a blood sample to test 
blood alochol content (T.43, Vol.I). The officer informed 
appellant that under the Implied Consent Law, if he refused to 
submit to a blood alochol test he would lose his license to 
drive for one year (T.50, Vol.I). At the hospital, appellant 
again indicated he did not want medical attention (T.44, Vol.I). 
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Appellant's religious convictions must be appraised in 
light of the fact that he is a Native American, raised on the 
Turtle Mountain Reservation in South Dakota. When Officer 
Thompson informed appellant that he would have to submit to 
a blood test, and that due to the seriousness of the injuries 
of the victim, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended 
he would be forced to take such a test, appellant repeatedly 
refused to consent on the basis that it was "against God's 
Law" (T.47,50,52,53, Vol.I). Nevertheless, the blood sample 
was taken (T.48,54, Vol.I). Appellant's counsel moved to 
suppress the results of the analysis of appellant's blood 
(T.62, Vol.I), which motion was denied by Judge Jay E. Banks 
(T.3, Vol.II). 
Appellant argues that the failure to suppress such evidenc 
was reversible error. At the time the blood sample was obtaine 
appellant made clear that such a procedure violated his religio' 
beliefs. Yet no attempt was made to substitute for the blood 
test either a breath or urine test, both of which are approved 
in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.lO(a) (1953 as amended). Under the 
reasoning of Schmerber, supra, where a person refuses to consen 
to a blood test on religious grounds, a result opposite to that 
reached in Schmerber is appropriate. Given the circumstance: 
of this case, appellant contends that taking a blood sample 
against his will was an unreasonable intrusion into his body 
(which he as a Native American believes should remain inviolate 
and thus violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
- 10 -
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United States Constitution. As such, the evidence obtained 
from the blood test should have been excluded under the 
authority of Mapp v. Ohio, supra. 
POINT B 
APPELLANT WAS COMPELLED THROUGH THE THREATENED USE 
OF FORCE TO PERMIT THE BLOOD SAMPLE TO BE TAKEN. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that invasions into 
the person warrant the most stringent protection of the Fourth 
Amendment's right to privacy. In Rochir. v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 (1952), the defendant was convicted of possession of 
Morphine. When officers entered defendant's home, he quickly 
put two pills in his mouth. The officers jumped on the defendant, 
attempting to extract the pills by violent means. The defertdant 
was then taken to a hospital, where an emetic was forced into his 
stomach against his will, forcing him to vomit. The pills 
were recovered and used in evidence at trial. 
In reversing defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court 
wrote: 
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. 
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the 
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth 
and remove what was there, the forcible ex-
traction of the somach's contents--this 
course of proceeding by agents of government 
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even 
hardened sensibilities. They are methods 
too close to the rack and screw to permit 
of constitutional differentiation. 
342 U.S. 165, 172. 
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In this case, although such force was never applied to 
the appellant's person, Trooper Lynn Thompson, the arresting 
officer, made it clear that he would use force, if necessary, 
in order to obtain the blood sample. He testified as follows, 
in response to questions from appellant's counsel: 
Q. You indicated to him at that point that 
if he refused to take the test you would take 
it by force, is that correct? 
A. Yes, I indicated he would be restrained. 
* * 
Q. How many times did you tell him if you 
don't take the test we are going to have to 
take it from you by force? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. More than once? 
A. I am sure more than once. 
(T. 54, Vol.I) 
Even as the conduct in Rochin was shocking, so too in this 
case the indiscriminate threats of violence applied by officen 
of the law against the appellant's person is "close to the 
rack and screw". The fine line between psychological and physi 
cal intimidation blurs when compared to the stringent protectio 
guaranteed to an individual's person by the Fourth Amendment 
and Rochin. Permitting such conduct will undercut these 
constitutional protections and will subject appellant and 
others to random threats of violence by law enforcement officer 
to secure by proscribed means that which they cannot obtain 
freely and legally. 
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POINT C 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-207(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD, PERMITTING CHEMICAL TEST RESULTS AS 
EVIDENCE WITHOUT REGARD TO A DEFENDANT'S CONSENT. 
Appellant further submits that insofar as Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-207(2) (1953 as amended) allows that the results of any 
chemical test administered on a defendant with or without his 
consent will be admissible in evidence subject only to the rules 
of evidence, is unconstitutionally overbroad. This is because 
under this provision, any chemical test, no matter how admini-
stered, and regardless of whom it is administered to, will be 
admissible. This provision sweeps too broadly in violation 
of the constitutional principles laid down in ~' Rochin 
and Schmerber, supra. 
POINT D 
THE BLOOD SAMPLE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
REFRAIN FROM GIVING EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF. 
The blood sample taken also violated appellant's rights 
under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. The relevant portion of Article I, Section 12 provides: 
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself ... " From the outset, it must be remembered that this 
provision is broader than the comparable federal self-incrimi-
nation privilege of the Fifth Amendment. That privilege has 
- 13 -
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been held to apply only to evidence which is of a testimonial 
or communicative nature. In Schmerber v. California, supra, 
the Fifth Amendment was expressly held not to apply to blood 
samples involuntarily taken from an arrestee. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has held that Article I, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah does apply 
to evidence of a non-testimonial or non-communicative nature. 
In State v. Sirmey, 40 Utah 525, 122 P.748 (1912), testimony 
was received which compared the shoes of the defendant with 
footprints found at a murder scene. The Court found: 
It is generally held, and as stated in 12 Cye. 402, 
that although evidence, including documents and 
other articles, may have been obtained in a 
criminal case by unfair or illegal methods, it 
is nevertheless, as a general rule, admissible if 
relevant, provided the accused is not thereby 
compelled to do any act which incriminates him, 
and the confession or incriminating admission is 
not extorted from him; and by the weight of 
authority it is held to be error to compel 
the accused to submit to a comparison of 
footprints and to permit a witness who was 
present when the accused was forcibly compelled 
to place his foot in footprints, or to surrender 
his shoes for the purpose of making a comparison, 
to testify as to the result; by where the accused 
voluntarily places his foot in the tracks, or 
surrenders his shoes to the sheriff, he cannot 
object to evidence that they seemed to fit. 
122 P. at 748. 
In that case, the Court went on to find that there was no com· 
pulsion involved, because the defendant gave the police officei 
his shoes upon the officer's request to make the comparison. 
The only other case in Utah dealing with the question of 
a defendant giving evidence against himself is State v. Van D~ 
- 14 -
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554 P.2d 1324 (1976). In that case the defendant was requested 
to give hair samples to the police to compare with samples found 
at the scene of a rape. He was also requested to give blood 
samples and fingerprints to the police, all of which were 
admitted in evidence. The Court emphasized the compulsion 
factor stating: 
As to state and federal constitutional provisions 
mentioned, defendant was not compelled to give 
(a) evidence, (b) or be a witness against himself. 
Yne officers relieved him of the hair (without 
any resistance). Under such circumstances the 
cases say no constitutional rights are violated. 
[Emphasis by the Court, footnote omitted] 
524 P.2d at 1325. 
In both of these cases, before the Court could logically 
reach the compulsion issue it had to find that the items re-
quested were within the protections of Article I, Section 12. 
The blood sample taken from the appellant in the case at hand 
is obviously within those same protections. The case at hand 
is distinguished from State v. Van Darn, supra, and State v. 
Sirrnay, supra, in that in those cases the evidence was relin-
quished upon request by policy officers. In the case at hand, 
appellant was compelled to give a blood sample. The arresting 
officer told appellant he would take a blood sample with or 
without appellant's consent and if appellant did not submit 
to the test the sample would be taken by force (T.54, Vol.I). 
Consequently, the appellant was compelled to give evidence 
against himself in violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination as described in Article I, Section 12 of the 
- 15 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The blood sample taken from appellant violated appellant's 
rights to be free from unreasonable searches as guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
violated his right not to be compelled to give evidence against 
himself as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitu· 
tion of the State of Utah. Because the Court erred in not 
granting appellant's motion to suppress the results of the bloc 
alcohol analysis, this Court should reverse the conviction and 
set it aside. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE 
RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST BECAUSE THE 
STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF 
SUCH TEST. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1953 as amended) provides: 
41-6-44.5. Driving while intoxicated--Chemical 
tests as evidence--Presumption of blood alcohol 
level.--In any action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was driving 
under the influence of alcohol, the results of 
a chemical test or tests as authorized in 41-6-
44.10 shall be admitted as evidence if the chemcial 
was taken within one hour of the alleged incident. 
The level of the alcohol determined to be in 
the blood by the chemical test shall be presumed 
to be not less than the blood alcohol level of 
the person at the time of the incident. If the 
chemcial test was not taken within one hour 
after the alleged incident, the evidence of the 
amount of alcohol in the person's blood as shown 
by the chemical test is admissible if expert 
testimony extablishes its probative value and 
the results of said test may be given prima facie 
effect if established by expert testimony. 
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The accident appellant was involved in occurred at ap-
's proximately 1:00 p.m. on July 28, 1977 (T.85, Vol.II). The 
blood sample for a blood alcohol test was withdrawn from 
appellant at 2:35 p.m. approximately one and a half hours 
:t after the accident (T. 76, Vol. III). Appellant contends that 
the probative value of the test was not established by the 
expert testimony and therefore the results of the blood alcohol 
test should not have been admitted into evidence. 
Lynn Davis, a chemist for the City-County Health Department 
of Salt Lake County, testified, over the objection of counsel, 
that the blood sample taken from appellant at 2:35 p.m. con-
tained 0.28% alcohol by weight (T.90, Vol.III). In an effort 
to relate back the figure to the time of the accident, the 
State called Clark Bowles, a sergeant with the Highway Patrol 
in charge of the Breathalyzer Project for the State of Utah. 
Officer Bowles testified to alcohol absorbtion rates and burn 
off rates in the body (T.110-111, Vol.III). Officers Bowles 
testified that in order to extrapolate the blood alcohol test 
back to a certain time, it was necessary to know when the 
individual last had something to drink (T.117-118, Vol.III). 
There was no evidence presented as to when appellant had had 
his last drink. Mr. Bowles testified that without knowing 
when the last drink was taken, he could not say with certainty 
what the blood alcohol level was at a given time (T.144, Vol. 
III). 
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Under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1953 as amended), the 
State's burden was to establish the probative value of the bloc 
test in proving what the level of appellant's intoxication was 
at the time of the accident. Since the testimony of the expert 
witnesses introduced by the State failed to show what appellant 
blood alcohol level may have been when the accident occurred, 
the State failed to meet its burden. Thus, the admission of 
the results of the blood alcohol test was error. 
Under Utah Rules of Evience, Rule 4, a verdict may be 
set aside on the grounds of erroneous admission of evidence 
only where there is a timely and specific objection interposed 
and the reviewing court finds that the evidence should have 
been excluded and probably had a substantial effect on the 
verdict. In this case, appellant's counsel objected to the 
admission of the results of the blood test on the ground that: 
probative value of such evidence had not been established under 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 by the testimony of Lynn Davis as 
an expert witness (T.89, Vol.III). The objection was overrule1 
(T. 89, Vol. III). 
Appellant submits that the evidence should have been 
excluded on the ground stated in his objection. Utah Code Ann 
$41-6-44.5 provides that the results of a blood alcohol test 
which was conducted more than one hour after the incident in 
question are admissible in evidence only if the "probative 
value" of such evidence is established by expert testimony. 
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The term "probative value" has been defined by this Court as 
evidence tending to prove an issue. State v. Scott, 111 Utah 
9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947). In the case of Liquor Control 
Conunission v. Bartolas, 225 N.E. 2d 859 (1963), the Ohio 
Court wrote: 
Probative evidence is testimony of substance 
and relevant consequences not vague or uncertain, 
but having the quality of proof or fitness to 
induce conviction of truth, and has reference 
to the substance of the testimony generally 
and not the credibility of the witness . 
225 N.E.2d 859, 862. See also Hunnicutt v. 
Boughner, 231 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. 1967). 
Appellant contends that the testimony of Lynn Davis and 
Officer Bowles failed to establish that the results of the 
blood alcohol test proved what appellant's blood alcohol level 
was at the time of the accident. The only way that such evidence 
could have been shown to have "probative value" as tending to 
prove appellant's blood alochol level at the relevant time was 
to establish that the expert could scientifically relate the 
results of the actual blood test back to the time of the acci-
dent. Officer Bowles testified that he could not establish 
with any degree of certainty what appellant's blood alcohol 
level was at the time of the accident without knowing when 
appellant took his last drink (T.144, Vol.III). No evidence 
was presented as to when the last drink was taken. The evidence 
of the results of the blood test did not have the "quality of 
proof" envisioned in Bartolas, supra. 
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Since the testimony of Officer Bowles as an expert 
witness failed to establish the probative value of the results 
of the blood test, testimony as to those results was not 
admissible under the standard established by Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44.5. The admission of such evidence by the trial 
court was error. 
Finally, the admission of the results of the blood 
alcohol test had a substantial influence upon the finding of 
the jury that appellant was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the accident. Given that the statutory presumptioi 
of intoxication arises at 0. 08%, when the jury heard Lynn Davis 
testify that the test revealed a blood acohol level of 0.28%, 
they were bound to infer that appellant had been intoxicated 
an hour and a half earlier when the accident occurred. It was 
at least possible that appellant consumed more alochol after 
the accident occurred (T.31, Vol.I), since he went into his 
residence after being arrested by Mr. Harenburg. Because of 
this, the inference that the results of the test established 
appellant's intoxication at the time of the accident was un-
warranted and prejudicial to appellant's case. 
Thus, the admission of evidence as to the results of 
the blood alcohol test should not have been admitted and the 
admission of such evidence was reversible error under Rule 
4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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POINT III 
THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT AROSE FROM A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-1-401 (1953 AS AMENDED); CONSEQUENTLY 
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA TO SOME OF THE CHARGES 
BARRED A SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
HOMICIDE CHARGE. 
Appellant was taken before Justice of the Peace Charles 
Jones on August 1, 1977, and pleaded guilty to the charges of 
Driving Under the Influence, Improper Registration, Driving 
Without a Driver's License and No Safety Inspection. Judge 
Jones did not have a complaint but was advised by the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office they would send him a complaint 
(M.30). Before taking his plea, Judge Jones informed appellant 
of his right to a trial and his right to counsel (M.10). 
Judge Jones then imposed sentence on the appellant for the 
charges and sent a commitment to the Salt Lake County Jail 
concerning the sentence (M.12-13). 
After deciding that he would file Automobile Homicide 
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney petitioned Judge Jones 
to set aside appellant's guilty plea, which he did (M.14-15). 
Appellant contends his plea to Driving Under the Influence 
bars a subsequent prosecution for Automobile Homicide. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended) provides: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode; 
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(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, un-
less the court otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the juris-
diction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prose-
cuting attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or 
indictment. 
Appellant has met the statutory requirement of the sing 
episode rule. All of the offenses charged were within the 
jurisdiction of a single court--the District Court. Further 
more, it is arguable that all offenses were known to the pro 
cutor's office at the time appellant was arraigned before Ju 
Jones on August 1, 1977. Judge Jones that day spoke with a 
clerk in the County Attorney's Office after appellant was br 
before him without a formal complaint. Later on, he spoke w 
Michael Christensen of the County Attorney's Office who assu 
him that a complaint would be forthcoming (M.8-9,30). On th 
basis, Judge Jones accepted appellant's pleas (M.11-12). Ye 
the deceased passed away at 8:30 p.m. on July 28, 1977, one 
and one half days before appellant was arraigned before the 
Justice of the Peace (T.54, Vol.II). It was not until Augus 
3, 1977, two days after appellant's arraignment and pleas of 
guilty, that the County Attorney filed Automobile Homicide 
charges against appellant, and petitioned Judge Jones to vac 
and set aside appellant's pleas of guilty (M.15,65). 
Appellant is aware that a similar argument has been mad 
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and rejected by this Court in State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 
(1978). Appellant contends that the opinion in that case was 
erroneous, that the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan 
should be adopted by this Court, and that Cooley should be 
overruled based upon the meaning set forth by Justice Maughan: 
Section 76-1-402(2) confers a valuable right on 
one charged with multiple offenses under a single 
criminal episode--he is not compelled to face 
the emotional trauma and expense of several trials, 
if his circumstances fall within the qualifying 
terms. Even under the reasoning of the majority 
opinion in State v. Johnson. the jurisdiction 
of the district court could be invoked, for 
the justice of the peace would not have jurisdic-
tion (would not be qualified) to try ali the 
offenses charged. Furthermore, Sec. 76-1-402(2), 
is a later enactment, conferring a substantive 
right, and it should be held, if it be necessary, 
to modify an earlier, procedural enactment. 
575 P.2d at 696. 
Appellant's guilty plea to the charges should have been 
a bar to any subsequent prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court's 
admission of blood test results obtained in violation of his 
constitutional rights and without requiring the State to 
establish the probative value of such tests, and its failure 
to apply the single episode rule to bar the prosecution of 
Automobile Homicide contribute reversible error. Appellant 
requests that this Court reverse the verdict of the jury and 
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the judgment entered thereon, and remand the instant case 
to the Third Judicial District Court with instructions to 
dismiss the Information. 
DATED this ~~day of November, 1979. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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